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Re: OT: The Truth About Predator Drones

Started by Archimedes' Lever December 18, 2009
On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 22:09:31 -0800 (PST), David Schwartz
<davids@webmaster.com> wrote:

>Cannot be done. The satellite that the predator talks to only supports >analog video.
Are you sure? General instrument was able to digitize, compress, and send no less than 12 standard 6MHz wide analog video signals up to a bird that was only for analog TV signals, and they effectively increased satellite channel capacity ten fold. I do not think that you have thought this through very well. Digital signals can be passed over analog carriers, and are, every day, no problem. It is all analog at some point.
On Sat, 19 Dec 2009 11:24:13 -0800, Archimedes' Lever
<OneBigLever@InfiniteSeries.Org> wrote:

>On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 19:04:59 -0600, krw <krw@att.bizzzzzzzzzzz> wrote: > >>On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 00:20:47 -0800, Archimedes' Lever >><OneBigLever@InfiniteSeries.Org> wrote: >> >>>On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 20:05:07 -0600, krw <krw@att.bizzzzzzzzzzz> wrote: >>> >>>>On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 17:44:12 -0800 (PST), Mark <makolber@yahoo.com> >>>>wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Passing encrypted video over a satellite network built for unencrypted >>>>>> analog video is not a trivial challenge. As far as I know, there >>>>>> exists no scheme to do this that has not been broken already. The >>>>>> problem is that encryption works partly by diffusing information so >>>>>> that no part of the output looks like any part of the input. The >>>>>> satellite link is filled with errors and distortion that have to be >>>>>> contained to retain adequate video quality. >>>>>> >>>>>> DS >>>>> >>>>>um,, is that why General Instrument was able to do it did it 15 years >>>>>ago for HBO? >>>> >>>>It can obviously be done. It just requires different, perhaps less >>>>efficient, error correction algorithms which may mean lower S/N >>>>required. >>> >>> Wrong. It just requires MORE FEC. >> >>AlswasWrong is once again wrong. Surprise everyone! > > > You're an idiot. Most digital links can handle up to 10 percent bit >error rate before correction coding fails to fix it.
And those error bits don't cost anything to send? What a moron you are, AlwaysWrong. Oh, and I forgot, you're always wrong too.
On Sat, 19 Dec 2009 11:25:39 -0800, Archimedes' Lever
<OneBigLever@InfiniteSeries.Org> wrote:

>On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 19:06:22 -0600, krw <krw@att.bizzzzzzzzzzz> wrote: > >>Real encryption is pretty cheap. The only complication anymore is key >>management. No matter what you do that's a problem, so might just as >>well make the encryption good. Rag heads aren't the only potential >>enemy. > > Or simply change the key so often that any brute force hackers will >fail to decrypt anything inside any effective time frame.
...and changing keys is free (hint: key management)? I know it's difficult for you DimBilb but read before replying.
On Sat, 19 Dec 2009 18:42:52 -0800 (PST), David Schwartz
<davids@webmaster.com> wrote:

>On Dec 18, 6:15&#2013266080;pm, Archimedes' Lever <OneBigLe...@InfiniteSeries.Org> >wrote: > >> &#2013266080;Real simple. &#2013266080;Make it TCP/IP and use IP encryption, just like the >> government and military does everywhere else. > >Sure, you just fly on up to the satellite and change its design so >that it handles a digital uplink rather than an analog one. I think >NASA has a space shuttle you can borrow. > >> &#2013266080;As far as your claim of knowing what they did implement... &#2013266080;I have >> serious doubts that you do. Your simple, blanket statement that it "is >> simply not encryption capable" is about as uninformed and stupid as it >> gets. >> >> &#2013266080; ANY data stream can be EASILY encrypted, and that at a very strong >> level. > >Sure, so long as there is decryption hardware on the other end. If the >other end is designed to receive an unencrypted analog uplink, it is >*not* an easy task to substitute encrypted video that can pass over >the existing system and still be reliably decrypted on the other end >despite noise in the analog signal. In fact, as far as I know, it is >still an unsolved problem and every solution to date has been >compromised. > >The system has an analog uplink and a digital downlink. The middle >essentially cannot be modified because it's satellites. The only >reasonable solution is to encrypt the video before the uplink, pass >the encrypted video over the analog uplink, and hope that the digital >downlink can still be reliably decrypted. If you think that's an easy >task, explain what technology you would use to do it. > >DS
Boeing and many others are currently working on such systems. You have not even been paying attention to some of the references made in this very thread. Since the idiot that referenced it was more concerned with putting down the government, it is not surprising that you may have missed his reference since it was framed inside a slew of insults. Anyway, it is common knowledge what IS used, AND what WILL be used, as well as the wish list for an entire, new constellation of satellites. It is only some of what is online now, and what is coming online and what may come online... _http://jpeojtrs.mil/files/org_info/SBIR_STTR_FINAL_PAGE_FLIP_LAYOUT_smaller.pdf
On Dec 19, 11:36&#2013266080;pm, Son of a Sea Cook
<NotaBrews...@thebarattheendoftheuniverse.org> wrote:
> &#2013266080; Boeing and many others are currently working on such systems. &#2013266080;You have > not even been paying attention to some of the references made in this > very thread.
Uhh...Boeing, if you have been reading the news, was Public Enemy #1 in all of this. The senate appropriates committees were so angry with being duped by them over a period of six years, that the military was forced to send Boeing a "show cause" letter, basically saying, "You need to give us a reason to continue giving you hundreds of millions of dollars because what you have 'given' us so far stinks." : http://mobiledevdesign.com/hardware_news/cluster_contract_cancelled/ Essentially, over a period from 1999-2005, Boeing was milking the cow while everyone slept. When it came time to show, they had nothing, a perplexing phenomenon that exist unto this day. The military also gave a significant portion of the JTRS $37 billion contract to another prime contractor, which incensed Boeing and normally would have resulted in a lawsuit by Boeing against the US Government, but in this case, Boeing was helpless to do anything, because they had already received the show cause letter, and an investigation would have exposed the other fraud/waste/and-or/abuse that they were already engaged in. So they watched helplessly as the other conctractor took the bacon.
> &#2013266080; Since the idiot that referenced it was more concerned with putting down > the government, it is not surprising that you may have missed his > reference since it was framed inside a slew of insults.
I must be the idiot that you are referring to. If your pseudonym is indicative of what your mother/father does for a living, it would not be surprising that you think that I am an idiot for critizing the military.
> &#2013266080; Anyway, it is common knowledge what IS used, AND what WILL be used, as > well as the wish list for an entire, new constellation of satellites.
Wish lists are nice. There is no less than $1 billion in research annually being spent annually to find solutions to problems in computer networking: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Internet That does not mean that the military-industrial complex will produce the solutions. Let's face it: JTRS is a real program that has been really with us since 1999. That's 10 years. They have had plenty of funds from US Government to produce. There was and is sufficient interest. Sufficient media attention. All the essential ingredients that would make a company like Boeing/Honeywell/Thales/etc. highly motivated to produce..they are present. And here we are, 2009, and the most that any of these companies have produced can best be described as a traditional "ManPack" radio, where transceiver is under software control, something that really has little to do with solving the problems and does not really solve problem of networking the radios. Frankly, the people running JTRS need to have a long talk with the IEEE people who created Wi-Fi. This will clear the air, and force the JTRS people to realize just how deep in it they are.
> &#2013266080;It is only some of what is online now, and what is coming online and > what may come online... > > _http://jpeojtrs.mil/files/org_info/SBIR_STTR_FINAL_PAGE_FLIP_LAYOUT_s...- Hide quoted text -
About a year ago, I read between 1250 and 1300 pages of documentation on this program, because I could not believe what I was reading. In a nutshell, the biggest problem with JTRS is that making software- defined radio is ~not~ the same as making a computer network of packets. It took them 6 years and $11 billon to discover this, while IEEE 802.11 committee members have known for decades and could have told them in the very first meeting in 1999 while the senators/etc. where getting all giddy about digitizing old field radios. Now that they realize their mistake - thinking that, just because waveform is under software control, everything will magically "talk" to each other in a glorified computer network - they are too proud to ask for help. If they were to simply go to IEEE 802.11 meetings, and say, "Hey guys...we have $5 billion to solve this problem we really screwed up. Can you help us salvage all the promises of fantastic radio network that we made...", one of first things that a Wi-Fi engineer will want to see: 1. The spectral bandwidth that they have available 2. The bit rates they have been promising people 3. Situational parameters (SINAD - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SINAD) ...and immediately conclude that the spectral bandwidth is horrifically out-of-line with the bit rates promised. [Perhaps this is the primary reason why JTRS refuses to talk to real experts in doing this kind of thing - the truth is too frightening]. Oddly, some people at the Pentagon and elsewhere, who have experienced using convential PDA's to communicate over Wi-Fi, have been asking a very basic question - "Why not use Wi-Fi?" This angers some in the JTRS's program because they view succumbing to Wi-Fi as personal failure. They generally invoke the argument that Wi-Fi is not secure, which is ridiculously misleading and irrelevant to the final architecture. I am not the only one critical of JTRS and other programs. Here is what the US GAO had to say, after a thorough, multi-month review of JTRS: "The JTRS program has encountered a number of problems, resulting in significant delays and cost increases. The proram is currently estimated to total about $37 billion.": http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06955.pdf If you read this document, and skip through the euphemisms, you will see that it essentially says, "These guys did not think about what they were doing before they started doing it." There are other peoeple, who have questioned the vision of JTRS and its associated program. Just go to Goole and look up "JTRS failure", and there are numerous criticisms especially from inside the military: http://tinyurl.com/yknd9pn I was also told by a high-ranking official at the Pentagon who has been involved in this since the very beginning that, at present, in 2009, the program should not be taken seriously by small companies hoping to receive funding, whether they are able to provide capability or not. The prime contractors, very large corporations, have already been chosen [the same ones that you see in the "JTRS failure" hits above], and the outstanding solicitations have been fielded as a matter of procedure. Note that there is nothing wrong with the highly-vague vision of JTRS: anything can communicate with anything else over highly dynamic world- wide network that especially includes mobile, secured, radios in the field. There are people the world over who will not disagree that this is a good idea. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Internet The problem is that there is a huge gap between vagueness and specificity, and for the past 10 years, the prime contractors and DARPA have earned a D+ on the specifics, IMO For those of you in sci.electronics.design and comp.dsp, for amusement, you might want to take a look at JTRS promised bit-rates, given the width and location of spectrum allocated to the military: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Tactical_Radio_System -Le Chaud Lapin-
On Sat, 19 Dec 2009 14:41:06 -0600, krw <krw@att.bizzzzzzzzzzz> wrote:

>On Sat, 19 Dec 2009 11:24:13 -0800, Archimedes' Lever ><OneBigLever@InfiniteSeries.Org> wrote: > >>On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 19:04:59 -0600, krw <krw@att.bizzzzzzzzzzz> wrote: >> >>>On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 00:20:47 -0800, Archimedes' Lever >>><OneBigLever@InfiniteSeries.Org> wrote: >>> >>>>On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 20:05:07 -0600, krw <krw@att.bizzzzzzzzzzz> wrote: >>>> >>>>>On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 17:44:12 -0800 (PST), Mark <makolber@yahoo.com> >>>>>wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Passing encrypted video over a satellite network built for unencrypted >>>>>>> analog video is not a trivial challenge. As far as I know, there >>>>>>> exists no scheme to do this that has not been broken already. The >>>>>>> problem is that encryption works partly by diffusing information so >>>>>>> that no part of the output looks like any part of the input. The >>>>>>> satellite link is filled with errors and distortion that have to be >>>>>>> contained to retain adequate video quality. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> DS >>>>>> >>>>>>um,, is that why General Instrument was able to do it did it 15 years >>>>>>ago for HBO? >>>>> >>>>>It can obviously be done. It just requires different, perhaps less >>>>>efficient, error correction algorithms which may mean lower S/N >>>>>required. >>>> >>>> Wrong. It just requires MORE FEC. >>> >>>AlswasWrong is once again wrong. Surprise everyone! >> >> >> You're an idiot. Most digital links can handle up to 10 percent bit >>error rate before correction coding fails to fix it. > >And those error bits don't cost anything to send?
snipped retarded playground child horseshit Yeah, asshole... it's called 'Link Budget'.
On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 23:27:05 -0500, "Michael A. Terrell"
<mike.terrell@earthlink.net> wrote:

> >HiggsField wrote: >> >> On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 05:56:55 -0500, "Michael A. Terrell" >> <mike.terrell@earthlink.net> wrote: >> >> > >> >Rick Jones wrote: >> >> >> >> In comp.protocols.tcp-ip Mark <makolber@yahoo.com> wrote: >> >> > > Passing encrypted video over a satellite network built for >> >> > > unencrypted analog video is not a trivial challenge. As far as I >> >> > > know, there exists no scheme to do this that has not been broken >> >> > > already. The problem is that encryption works partly by diffusing >> >> > > information so that no part of the output looks like any part of >> >> > > the input. The satellite link is filled with errors and distortion >> >> > > that have to be contained to retain adequate video quality. >> >> >> >> > um,, is that why General Instrument was able to do it did it 15 years >> >> > ago for HBO? >> >> >> >> Is it "known" that the GI stuff (irony :) isn't cracked? >> > >> > >> > You do know there were two levels of Videocipher? VC-1 was designed >> >for military applications. >> >> Total bullshit. It was designed for backhaul work. It was also used >> by companies like General Motors, to feed training seminars, etc. to all >> their dealerships. They were one of the first OTA educational systems of >> that depth. >> >> ALL the major networks ended up using it, and that is what made GI the >> de facto standard, and is why they were UNsuccessfully sued as a >> monopoly. Uplink encoding is used by any content provider, and they must >> use GI gear because that is what all the birds use. So they ARE a >> monopoly, by default, but it is not their fault all the networks went >> with their gear. >> >> > VC-II was a very scaled down version done for >> >HBO in the early '80s. >> >> VC-I was in use in 1983 and from then on. >> >> It was retired on the last day of last year, 2008. >> >> VC-II (1985)"was done for" satellite receivers, uplink encoders and >> decoders, and backhaul work, not just for HBO. It was retired in 1993 as >> piracy had to be nipped out of the system. That was VC-II RS and that is >> where the false keys and rolling keys and such came from. Then came >> DigiCipher and DigiCipher II. >> >> > I installed one of the first VC-II units for >> >beta testing for HBO at United Video in Cincinnati, Ohio. That would >> >make it 25 years. >> >> It appears that you understand basic math. >> >> VC-II was hardware items for cable system operators, sure, but it was >> ALSO hardware items for use in end user satellite set-top boxes, which >> have nothing to do with cable. > > > ESD, dimbulb.
You're a total retard, TurdEl.
TheJoker wrote:
> > On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 23:27:05 -0500, "Michael A. Terrell" > <mike.terrell@earthlink.net> wrote: > > > > >HiggsField wrote: > >> > >> On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 05:56:55 -0500, "Michael A. Terrell" > >> <mike.terrell@earthlink.net> wrote: > >> > >> > > >> >Rick Jones wrote: > >> >> > >> >> In comp.protocols.tcp-ip Mark <makolber@yahoo.com> wrote: > >> >> > > Passing encrypted video over a satellite network built for > >> >> > > unencrypted analog video is not a trivial challenge. As far as I > >> >> > > know, there exists no scheme to do this that has not been broken > >> >> > > already. The problem is that encryption works partly by diffusing > >> >> > > information so that no part of the output looks like any part of > >> >> > > the input. The satellite link is filled with errors and distortion > >> >> > > that have to be contained to retain adequate video quality. > >> >> > >> >> > um,, is that why General Instrument was able to do it did it 15 years > >> >> > ago for HBO? > >> >> > >> >> Is it "known" that the GI stuff (irony :) isn't cracked? > >> > > >> > > >> > You do know there were two levels of Videocipher? VC-1 was designed > >> >for military applications. > >> > >> Total bullshit. It was designed for backhaul work. It was also used > >> by companies like General Motors, to feed training seminars, etc. to all > >> their dealerships. They were one of the first OTA educational systems of > >> that depth. > >> > >> ALL the major networks ended up using it, and that is what made GI the > >> de facto standard, and is why they were UNsuccessfully sued as a > >> monopoly. Uplink encoding is used by any content provider, and they must > >> use GI gear because that is what all the birds use. So they ARE a > >> monopoly, by default, but it is not their fault all the networks went > >> with their gear. > >> > >> > VC-II was a very scaled down version done for > >> >HBO in the early '80s. > >> > >> VC-I was in use in 1983 and from then on. > >> > >> It was retired on the last day of last year, 2008. > >> > >> VC-II (1985)"was done for" satellite receivers, uplink encoders and > >> decoders, and backhaul work, not just for HBO. It was retired in 1993 as > >> piracy had to be nipped out of the system. That was VC-II RS and that is > >> where the false keys and rolling keys and such came from. Then came > >> DigiCipher and DigiCipher II. > >> > >> > I installed one of the first VC-II units for > >> >beta testing for HBO at United Video in Cincinnati, Ohio. That would > >> >make it 25 years. > >> > >> It appears that you understand basic math. > >> > >> VC-II was hardware items for cable system operators, sure, but it was > >> ALSO hardware items for use in end user satellite set-top boxes, which > >> have nothing to do with cable. > > > > > > ESD, dimbulb. > > You're a total retard, TurdEl.
You're always trying to pull people down to your level, Chicken Choker. -- Offworld checks no longer accepted!
On Wed, 23 Dec 2009 14:42:18 -0700, Eric Jacobsen
<eric.jacobsen@ieee.org> wrote:

>On 12/22/2009 11:48 PM, Archimedes' Lever wrote: >> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 22:49:52 -0700, Eric Jacobsen >> <eric.jacobsen@ieee.org> wrote: >> >>> On 12/22/2009 9:18 PM, Jerry Avins wrote: >>>> Archimedes' Lever wrote: >>>>> On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 02:08:44 +0000 (UTC), Rick Jones<rick.jones2@hp.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Is it "known" that the GI stuff (irony :) isn't cracked? >>>>>> >>>>>> rick jones >>>>> None of their stuff has ever been cracked. >>>>> >>>>> There were chips sold that made receivers "all channel" devices that >>>>> circumnavigated PPV choices, etc, but NOBODY... EVER... BROKE... ANY >>>>> General Instrument crypto schema. >>>> Circumnavigated? >>> Went around, I think. Like claiming the lock on the safe is >>> unpickable, but the hinge pins can be easily pulled. Nobody will bother >>> to break a weak code when the back door is open. >> >> >> That is not what happened either, ya dope. >> >> The chips were being fabbed in greater number than those being sold to >> the set top box makers, and that meant that hot chips were going out the >> back door ... of the fab house. That has nothing to do with breaking >> any code anywhere. > >I think you misread. You could try again, but I've not a lot of >confidence in the outcome.
Maybe it is due to your bloodline's goddamned idiot factor. There was NO breach of the crypto code or schema, so it would be YOU that has obviously mis-read. Hacked boxes were sold, and the hack was NOT a breaking of the protection schema's operation, it was by bypassing it altogether within the chip. That scenario is not even possible any longer.
On 12/23/2009 5:58 PM, Archimedes' Lever wrote:
> On Wed, 23 Dec 2009 14:42:18 -0700, Eric Jacobsen > <eric.jacobsen@ieee.org> wrote: > >> On 12/22/2009 11:48 PM, Archimedes' Lever wrote: >>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 22:49:52 -0700, Eric Jacobsen >>> <eric.jacobsen@ieee.org> wrote: >>> >>>> On 12/22/2009 9:18 PM, Jerry Avins wrote: >>>>> Archimedes' Lever wrote: >>>>>> On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 02:08:44 +0000 (UTC), Rick Jones<rick.jones2@hp.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Is it "known" that the GI stuff (irony :) isn't cracked? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> rick jones >>>>>> None of their stuff has ever been cracked. >>>>>> >>>>>> There were chips sold that made receivers "all channel" devices that >>>>>> circumnavigated PPV choices, etc, but NOBODY... EVER... BROKE... ANY >>>>>> General Instrument crypto schema. >>>>> Circumnavigated? >>>> Went around, I think. Like claiming the lock on the safe is >>>> unpickable, but the hinge pins can be easily pulled. Nobody will bother >>>> to break a weak code when the back door is open. >>> >>> That is not what happened either, ya dope. >>> >>> The chips were being fabbed in greater number than those being sold to >>> the set top box makers, and that meant that hot chips were going out the >>> back door ... of the fab house. That has nothing to do with breaking >>> any code anywhere. >> I think you misread. You could try again, but I've not a lot of >> confidence in the outcome. > > > Maybe it is due to your bloodline's goddamned idiot factor. > > There was NO breach of the crypto code or schema, so it would be YOU > that has obviously mis-read. Hacked boxes were sold, and the hack was > NOT a breaking of the protection schema's operation, it was by bypassing > it altogether within the chip. That scenario is not even possible any > longer.
Uh, yeah, so you did, in fact, misread. -- Eric Jacobsen Minister of Algorithms Abineau Communications http://www.abineau.com